atril/backend, branch v1.20.1

epub: allow to save epub documents

2018-03-16T17:05:20+00:00

inspired by:
https://github.com/linuxmint/xreader/commit/63a28f
https://github.com/linuxmint/xreader/issues/165

epub: fix loading epub thumbnails

2018-03-16T17:04:56+00:00

origin commit:
https://github.com/linuxmint/xreader/commit/6ed0ee1

Note: origin commit causes some serious build warnings,
......fixed.

epub: make minizip support more BSD variants

2018-01-16T12:07:18+00:00

closes https://github.com/mate-desktop/atril/issues/290 which has the original patch

pdf: Implement ev_document_text_get_text_attrs()

2017-09-06T16:25:34+00:00

origin commit:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/evince/commit/?h=gnome-3-10&id=96b9a1

pdf: Reset the annotation mapping when there are no more annotations

2017-08-28T14:04:01+00:00

https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=649044
origin commit:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/evince/commit/?id=06e9129

pdf: Implement remove_annotation virtual func

2017-08-28T14:04:01+00:00

https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=649044
origin commit:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/evince/commit/?id=38ca871

pdf: Make annotation names unique

2017-08-28T14:04:00+00:00

Naming the annotations sequentially by number is
problematic when they can be removed (see
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=649044#c33).
This patch changes the annotation names to
timestamps, guaranteeing that they are indeed
unique.

https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=649044
origin commit:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/evince/commit/?id=0f38a27
fix build warning:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/evince/commit/?id=6197eba

pdf: Add support for adding other types of annotations

2017-08-28T14:04:00+00:00

Implementing switch/case to support new annotations as they are implemented.

origin commit:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/evince/commit/?id=320d10f

pdf: Add activation link for Fields that have it.

2017-08-28T14:04:00+00:00

origin commit:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/evince/commit/?h=gnome-3-10&id=01254fb

dvi: Mitigate command injection attacks by quoting filename

2017-08-20T14:45:33+00:00

With commit 1fcca0b8041de0d6074d7e17fba174da36c65f99 came a DVI backend.
It exports to PDF via the dvipdfm tool.
It calls that tool with the filename of the currently loaded document.
If that filename is cleverly crafted, it can escape the currently
used manual quoting of the filename.  Instead of manually quoting the
filename, we use g_shell_quote.

https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=784947

origin commit:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/evince/commit/?id=350404c