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authorTobias Mueller <[email protected]>2017-07-14 12:52:14 +0200
committerraveit65 <[email protected]>2017-08-20 16:45:33 +0200
commit4650fb05e46e144be986a11a666a47add39b3799 (patch)
tree1a82735a5ce24aac04d96675aa20f18c479cee60 /po/pl.po
parent6adf8d121576010e741d0302503f0bed25672004 (diff)
downloadatril-4650fb05e46e144be986a11a666a47add39b3799.tar.bz2
atril-4650fb05e46e144be986a11a666a47add39b3799.tar.xz
dvi: Mitigate command injection attacks by quoting filename
With commit 1fcca0b8041de0d6074d7e17fba174da36c65f99 came a DVI backend. It exports to PDF via the dvipdfm tool. It calls that tool with the filename of the currently loaded document. If that filename is cleverly crafted, it can escape the currently used manual quoting of the filename. Instead of manually quoting the filename, we use g_shell_quote. https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=784947 origin commit: https://git.gnome.org/browse/evince/commit/?id=350404c
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