diff options
author | Perberos <[email protected]> | 2011-11-04 22:16:15 -0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Perberos <[email protected]> | 2011-11-04 22:16:15 -0300 |
commit | fff4ecc82f2bcfa7427596e7ad9c3769fcab040b (patch) | |
tree | ac4f1812a7991609c9c32c776daede2d8492f7b5 /src/gs-auth-pwent.c.orig | |
download | mate-screensaver-fff4ecc82f2bcfa7427596e7ad9c3769fcab040b.tar.bz2 mate-screensaver-fff4ecc82f2bcfa7427596e7ad9c3769fcab040b.tar.xz |
first commit
Diffstat (limited to 'src/gs-auth-pwent.c.orig')
-rw-r--r-- | src/gs-auth-pwent.c.orig | 291 |
1 files changed, 291 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/gs-auth-pwent.c.orig b/src/gs-auth-pwent.c.orig new file mode 100644 index 0000000..21abbee --- /dev/null +++ b/src/gs-auth-pwent.c.orig @@ -0,0 +1,291 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 8 -*- + * + * Copyright (c) 1993-1998 Jamie Zawinski <[email protected]> + * Copyright (C) 2006 William Jon McCann <[email protected]> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the + * License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + * General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA + * 02111-1307, USA. + * + */ + +#include "config.h" + +#include <stdlib.h> +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +# include <unistd.h> +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H +# include <crypt.h> +#endif + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <pwd.h> +#include <grp.h> + +#ifdef __bsdi__ +# include <sys/param.h> +# if _BSDI_VERSION >= 199608 +# define BSD_AUTH +# endif +#endif /* __bsdi__ */ + +#include <glib.h> +#include <glib/gi18n.h> + +#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_PASSWD) /* passwds live in /etc/shadow */ + +# include <shadow.h> +# define PWTYPE struct spwd * +# define PWPSLOT sp_pwdp +# define GETPW getspnam + +#elif defined(HAVE_ENHANCED_PASSWD) /* passwds live in /tcb/files/auth/ */ +/* M.Matsumoto <[email protected]> */ +# include <sys/security.h> +# include <prot.h> + +# define PWTYPE struct pr_passwd * +# define PWPSLOT ufld.fd_encrypt +# define GETPW getprpwnam + +#elif defined(HAVE_ADJUNCT_PASSWD) + +# include <sys/label.h> +# include <sys/audit.h> +# include <pwdadj.h> + +# define PWTYPE struct passwd_adjunct * +# define PWPSLOT pwa_passwd +# define GETPW getpwanam + +#elif defined(HAVE_HPUX_PASSWD) + +# include <hpsecurity.h> +# include <prot.h> + +# define PWTYPE struct s_passwd * +# define PWPSLOT pw_passwd +# define GETPW getspwnam + +# define HAVE_BIGCRYPT + +#endif + +#include "gs-auth.h" + +static gboolean verbose_enabled = FALSE; + +static char *encrypted_user_passwd = NULL; + +GQuark +gs_auth_error_quark (void) +{ + static GQuark quark = 0; + if (! quark) + { + quark = g_quark_from_static_string ("gs_auth_error"); + } + + return quark; +} + +void +gs_auth_set_verbose (gboolean enabled) +{ + verbose_enabled = enabled; +} + +gboolean +gs_auth_get_verbose (void) +{ + return verbose_enabled; +} + +static gboolean +passwd_known (const char *pw) +{ + return (pw && + pw[0] != '*' && /* This would be sensible... */ + strlen (pw) > 4); /* ...but this is what Solaris does. */ +} + +static char * +get_encrypted_passwd (const char *user) +{ + char *result = NULL; + +#ifdef PWTYPE + if (user && *user && !result) + { + /* First check the shadow passwords. */ + PWTYPE p = GETPW ((char *) user); + if (p && passwd_known (p->PWPSLOT)) + { + result = g_strdup (p->PWPSLOT); + } + } +#endif /* PWTYPE */ + + if (user && *user && !result) + { + /* Check non-shadow passwords too. */ + struct passwd *p = getpwnam (user); + if (p && passwd_known (p->pw_passwd)) + { + result = g_strdup (p->pw_passwd); + } + } + + /* The manual for passwd(4) on HPUX 10.10 says: + + Password aging is put in effect for a particular user if his + encrypted password in the password file is followed by a comma and + a nonnull string of characters from the above alphabet. This + string defines the "age" needed to implement password aging. + + So this means that passwd->pw_passwd isn't simply a string of cyphertext, + it might have trailing junk. So, if there is a comma in the string, and + that comma is beyond position 13, terminate the string before the comma. + */ + if (result && strlen (result) > 13) + { + char *s = strchr (result + 13, ','); + if (s) + { + *s = 0; + } + } + +#ifndef HAVE_PAM + /* We only issue this warning if not compiled with support for PAM. + If we're using PAM, it's not unheard of that normal pwent passwords + would be unavailable. */ + + if (!result) + { + g_warning ("Couldn't get password of \"%s\"", + (user ? user : "(null)")); + } + +#endif /* !HAVE_PAM */ + + return result; +} + +/* This has to be called before we've changed our effective user ID, + because it might need privileges to get at the encrypted passwords. + Returns false if we weren't able to get any passwords, and therefore, + locking isn't possible. (It will also have written to stderr.) +*/ + +gboolean +gs_auth_priv_init (void) +{ + const char *u; + + u = g_get_user_name (); + + encrypted_user_passwd = get_encrypted_passwd (u); + + if (encrypted_user_passwd != NULL) + { + return TRUE; + } + else + { + return FALSE; + } +} + + +gboolean +gs_auth_init (void) +{ + if (encrypted_user_passwd != NULL) + { + return TRUE; + } + else + { + return FALSE; + } +} + +static gboolean +passwds_match (const char *cleartext, + const char *ciphertext) +{ + char *s = NULL; /* note that on some systems, crypt() may return null */ + + s = (char *) crypt (cleartext, ciphertext); + if (s && !strcmp (s, ciphertext)) + { + return TRUE; + } + +#ifdef HAVE_BIGCRYPT + /* There seems to be no way to tell at runtime if an HP machine is in + "trusted" mode, and thereby, which of crypt() or bigcrypt() we should + be calling to compare passwords. So call them both, and see which + one works. */ + + s = (char *) bigcrypt (cleartext, ciphertext); + if (s && !strcmp (s, ciphertext)) + { + return TRUE; + } + +#endif /* HAVE_BIGCRYPT */ + + return FALSE; +} + +gboolean +gs_auth_verify_user (const char *username, + const char *display, + GSAuthMessageFunc func, + gpointer data, + GError **error) +{ + char *password; + + password = NULL; + + /* ask for the password for user */ + if (func != NULL) + { + func (GS_AUTH_MESSAGE_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF, + "Password: ", + &password, + data); + } + + if (password == NULL) + { + return FALSE; + } + + if (encrypted_user_passwd && passwds_match (password, encrypted_user_passwd)) + { + return TRUE; + } + else + { + return FALSE; + } +} |