summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/src/caja-application.h
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authortarakbumba <[email protected]>2015-04-07 00:07:27 +0300
committertarakbumba <[email protected]>2015-04-07 00:07:27 +0300
commitadc45ec84298f6246d9ed219607bb5c169f50e08 (patch)
treef4a74caaaa94c09ea1b951c4a6874b23c144e0ea /src/caja-application.h
parent304866dd42e3ec1d8f1694f42c69af247a772330 (diff)
downloadcaja-adc45ec84298f6246d9ed219607bb5c169f50e08.tar.bz2
caja-adc45ec84298f6246d9ed219607bb5c169f50e08.tar.xz
Fix for https://github.com/mate-desktop/caja/issues/398
On the Shmoocon at 2011 there was a presentation by Jon Larimer demonstrating how to abuse vulnerabilities and bugs, or even just creating socially or security compromising thumbnails in mounting and thumbnailing, which happens on automounting USB drives. This is a particular issue when this happens on a locked box where the attacker doesn't otherwise have access to the user account: http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=10544 Disable automounting if the MATE screen saver is currently locked. See also https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=642020 This commit is merely based on : https://git.gnome.org/browse/nautilus/commit/?h=gnome-2-32&id=b7262fa945ef1ea936c15f0d248ad7a024d97dca
Diffstat (limited to 'src/caja-application.h')
-rw-r--r--src/caja-application.h4
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/caja-application.h b/src/caja-application.h
index 27cd8e18..699083a8 100644
--- a/src/caja-application.h
+++ b/src/caja-application.h
@@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ typedef struct
EggSMClient* smclient;
GVolumeMonitor* volume_monitor;
unsigned int automount_idle_id;
+ gboolean screensaver_active;
+ guint ss_watch_id;
+ GDBusProxy *ss_proxy;
+ GList *volume_queue;
} CajaApplication;
typedef struct